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FINAL 
AMBASSADOR'S OPENING RE~ARKS FOR SSC 8/29/82 
THANK YOUJ ~R. CHAIRMAN. WILL SPEAK BRIEFLY) 
TOUCHING ON TWO GENERAL AREAS OF CONCERN TO THIS SECURITY 
Sua-COMMITTEE CONSULTATION. FIRST) I WOULD LIKE TO 
MAKE SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE BROADER CONTEXT 
WITHIN WHICH WE SEEK TO STRENGTHEN US-JAPANESE DEFENSE 
COOPERATION, SECONDLY) I SHALL OFFER A FEW THOUGHTS ON 
THE SPECIFIC ISSUES WE EXPECT TO DISCUSS IN THE NEXT 
THREE DAYS, 
As YOU HAVE ALL HEARD ME SAY MANY TIMES) I BELIEVE 
THE US-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP IS THE SINGLE MOST 'IMPORTANT 
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE WORLD. WE SHARE THE 
WORLD'S LARGEST OVERSEAS BILATERAL TRADE. WE SHARE BROAD 
SECURI TY INTERESTS) WHICH AFFECT NOT ONLY OUR OWN SECUR ITY 
BUT ALSO THE SECURITY OF THE EAST AsiAN REGION, THE US-
JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY IS THE CORNERSTONE OF STABILITY 
IN THE PACIFIC. ( LOSE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES HAS BECOME ESSENTIAL 
TO MAINTAINING A STABLE) FREE) AND PROSPEROUS INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM. 
ANY BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OF THIS MAGNITUDE ENGENDERS 
COUNTLESS POSSIBILITIES FOR CONFLICTING INTERESTS) MISUNDER-
STANDINGS) AND ANY NUMBER OF PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL. lT 
IS ONE OF THE GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF POSTWAR HISTORY THAT 
THE U~fTED STATES AND JAPAN) TWO COUNTRIES WITH SUCH VASTLY 
-
DIFFERENT CULTURAL AND GEO-POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES) WOULD 
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HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DEVELOPING SUCH A PRODUCTIVE AND 
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PARTNERSHIP. 
I BELIEVE THAT THIS ACHIEVEMENT IS EXPLAINED LARGELY 
BY THE FACT THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD 
HAVE MAINTAINED A VERY CLEAR SENSE OF PURPOSE ABOUT THE 
RELATIONSHIP AND THE MUTUAL BENEFITS TO BE GAINED FROM A 
SOLID US-JAPANESE ALLIANCE. CONSEQUENTLY~ BOTH GOVERNMENTS 
HAVE WORKED HARD TO MAKE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAJOR 
ISSUES THAT DESERVE ATTENTION AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL 
LEVELS AND SMALLER SHORT-TERM ISSUES THAT ARE BEST RESOLVED 
AT A LOWER LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT. 
BOTH GOVERNMENTS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS MUST~ OF COURSE~ RESPOND TO A GREAT 
VAR I ETY OF DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES) MANY OF WHICH TEND TO 
VIEW ISSUES THROUGH THE PRISM OF A SINGLE-MINDED CONCERN. 
IN ALL TOO MANY CASESJ THE VOICES OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS 
AND THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESS CAN CAUSE OTHERWISE SECONDARY 
ISSUES TO CAST A SHADOW OVER THE ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP. IN 
SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE IT BECOMES VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE 
GOVERNMENTS THEMSELVES TO KEEP THEIR COLLECTIVE EYE ON THE 
BALL ANDJ TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLEJ INSURE THAT THE NEGOTIATING 
PROCESSJ OR THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE~ DOES NOT BECOME UNMANAGEABLE. 
THIS REQUIRESJ IN PARTICULAR~ THAT WE MAINTAIN A SENSITIVITY 
TO THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH EACH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS 
MUST OPERATE. 
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IT HAS BEEN ROUGHLY 30 YEARS SINCE THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF THIS RELATIONSHIP WERE LAID DOWN~ AND THE LEADERSHIP 
ON BOTH SIDES IS NOW PASSING TO AN ENTIRELY NEW GENERATION, 
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE MAJOR CHALLENGE WE FACE IN US-
JAPANESE RELATIONS IS TO ENSURE THAT THIS NEW GENERATION 
OF LEADERS WILL BE EQUALLY SENSITIVE TO THE VITAL 
IMPORTANCE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP--AN IMPORTANCE WHICH TODAY 
IS MEASURED NOT JUST IN TERMS OF BENEFITS TO THE UNITED 
STATES AND JAPAN~ BUT ALSO IN ITS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STABILITY AND THE SECURITY OF 
THE PAC IF IC REGION. 
THE US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY IS~ NEEDLESS TO SAY~ THE 
MAJOR PILLAR OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNI TED 
STATES. IT PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A STRONG US PRESENCE 
IN ~HE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANSJ AND IT ENSURES THE 
STRATEGIC DEFENSE OF JAPAN. THIS SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 
HAS A NUMBER OF UNIQUE FEATURES THAT HAVE BEEN FORGED TO 
MEET THE SPECIAL CONCERNS AND NEEDS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, AT 
TIMES IT DEFIES ANALOGY TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THE UNITED 
STATES HAS WITH OTHER MAJOR ALLIES. Bur IT HAS PROVEN OVER 
THE YEARS TO BE A FIRM AND ADAPTABLE BASIS ON WHICH TO 
BUILD AN INCREASINGLY STRONGER SECURITY BOND TO MEET A 
CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, 
THE PERIOD WE ARE PASSING THROUGH NOW IN US-JAPANESE 
SECURITY RELATIONS WILL~ I BELIEVE~ ULTIMATELY PROVE TO BE 
ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PERIODS OF ADAPTATION. A CON-
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VERGENCE OF TWO MAJOR FORCES IS AT WORK. FIRST~ A 
SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT IN JAPANESE PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE 
ISSUES IS OCCURRING. THIS IS GIVING RISE TO A MORE OPEN 
AND REASONED PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE QUESTIONS IN JAPAN~ 
AND THUS PROVIDING A MORE FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE HARD DECISIONS ABOUT STRENGTHENING 
THE SELF-DEFENSE FoRCES. THE SECOND FORCE IS THE INCREASING 
PRESSURE ON THE US GOVERNMENT TO STRENGTHEN ITS STRATEGIC 
AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND DEPLOY THEM MORE FLEXIBLY TO 
MEET NEW THREATS~ PARTICULARLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION. 
~ANAGING A SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM THE DEFENSE CONCEPTS 
OF THE 1970s TO THOSE NECESSARY TO MEET THE SECURITY CHALLENGES 
OF THE 1990s WILL BE DIFFICULT, lT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO 
MAINTAIN THE BROAD SUPPORT OF BOTH THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 
PEOPLE FOR A STRONG SECURITY BOND. THIS IS NOT ONLY A MATTER 
OF EACH GOVERNMENT BEING SENSITIVE TO THE OTHER'S DOMESTIC 
PRESSURES, IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF EACH GOVERNMENT ENSURING 
THAT ITS OWN ELECTORATE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF STRONG 
US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS, 
UNDER THESE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES~ WHAT IS THE UNITED 
STATES IN FACT SEEKING FROM JAPAN IN THE DEFENSE FIELD AND 
HOW DO WE IN THE UNITED STATES SEE OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY 
ROLES? 
THE- UNITED STATES IS ASKING JAPAN~ AS WE HAVE OUR 
OTHER ALLIES~ TO IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITY OF DEFENDING ITSELF 
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SO AS TO DETER POSSIBLE CONFLICT ARISING FROM AN INCREASINGLY 
SERIOUS AND VERIFIABLE SOVIET THREAT IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD , 
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE MAJOR BUILD-UP IN THE SoVIET OFFEN-
SIVE MI LITARY CAPABILITY IN THE AsiA/PACIFIC REGION OVER 
THE LAST DECADE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS 
OF THE SOVIETS~ OR ANY NATION FOR THAT MATTER. INTENTIONS 
CAN CHANGE OVERNIGHT, WE MUST RATHER DEAL WITH SOVIET MI LITARY 
CAPABILITIES AND THESE ARE FORMIDABLE INDEED. 
IN A MILITARY SENSE WE REGARD JAPAN'S PRINCIPAL ROLE 
AS BEING PRECISELY THE SAME AS IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN~ TO 
MAINTAIN FORCES CAPABLE OF MEETING AND RESISTING -A CONVENTIONAL 
ATTACK ON JAPAN. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT EXPECT JAPAN 
TO PLAY A REGIONAL MILITARY ROLE IN EAST ASIA. WE REMAIN 
FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
ON THE SELF-DEFENSE FoRCES AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THESE 
CONSTRAINTS LIMIT THE SDF's ACTIVITY TO JAPAN'S TERRITORY 
AND~ AS JAPAN . HAS STATED~ ITS SEALANES TO A DISTANCE OF 
SOME 1~000 NAUTICAL MILES, 
CONTRARY TO SOME REPORTS I HAVE SEEN~ THE US HAS NOT 
SUGGESTED SPECIFIC DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS FOR THE SELF-
DEFENSE FORCES~ NOR DO WE ANTICIPATE DOING SO, WE ARE 
WELL AWARE THAT MANY FACTORS~ BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL) 
MUST BE CONSIDERED IN SETTING BUDGETARY PRIORITIES AND MUST 
ALWAYS REMAIN A SOVEREIGN DECISION FOR ANY COUNTRY, 
AM NOT ALTOGETHER SURE WHAT CONSTITUTES "PRESSURE. " 
CERTAINLY (IN KEEPING WITH OUR STATUS AS ALLIES UNDER THE 
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MuTUAL SECURITY TREATY WHICH PROVIDES FOR A CONTINUAL 
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS) ~!E HAVE CONFERRED REGULARLY AND 
FREQUENTLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN ON DEFENSE MATTERS. 
IN GENERALJ WE HAVE FOUND THAT ITS PROGRAMS COMPLEMENT OUR 
OWN EFFORTS IN EAST AsiA. IN RECENT YEARS} HOWEVERJ WE 
HAVE URGED JAPAN TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT 
ON AN URGENT BASIS THE PROGRAM GOALS IT HAS SET FOR ITSELF. 
DESPITE TALK OF "US PRESSURE}" THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY 
OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE PLANS WILL BE JAPAN} 
NOT THE UNITED STATES. IT IS TRUE} HOWEVER} THAT E~HANCED 
~ . 
JAPANESE DEFENSE CAPABILITIEs ··wiLL STRENGTHEN THE 
OVERALL DETERRENT VALUE OF OUR ALLIANCE. 
THUS I BELIEVE THAT JAPAN'S ACTIONS IN THE DEFENSE 
FIELD} RATHER THAN BEING CONSTRUED AS A RESPONSE TO A 
"US REQUEST" SHOULD BE VIENED AS ITS OWN RESPONSE TO A 
THREATENING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. WE MAY HAVE SLIGHTLY 
DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF THE THREATJ BUT 
WE AGREE THAT IT EXISTS AND HAS INCREASED. 
I AM OCCASIONALLY PUZZLED BY EFFORTS TO PORTRAY US-
JAPANESE DEFENSE COOPERATION AS SINISTER OR UNDERHANDED. FoR 
EXAMPLE} THE UNITED STATES IS DEPICTED AS HAVING AN ULTERIOR 
MOTIVE IN WISHING TO HAVE ACCESS TO JAPANESE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 
OR MATERIAL} IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT US TECHNOLOGY DEFENSE 
PRODUCTION "KNOW HOW" HAS FLOWED TO JAPAN FOR OVER A QUARTER 
OF A CENTURY NOW, SIMILARLY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US ON A 
DIVISION OF DEFENSE ROLES AND OUR COMBINED DEFENSE EXERCISES} 
BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD SEEM NATURALJ ESSENTIAL EVE~} FOR MILl-
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TARY ALLIES) ARE SOMETIMES PORTRAYED AS AIMED AT ENCOURAGING 
JAPAN TO PROCEED ONCE AGAIN DOWN THE PATH OF MILITARISM OR 
TO REVISE JAPAN's cor~sTITUTION oR THE MuTUAL SEcURITY TREATY. 
JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION IS SOMETHING FOR IT ALONE TO CHANGE 
OR NOT TO CHANGE AS THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN SO DESIRE. As FOR 
THE SECURITY TREATY) MY GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT ABSOLUTELY 
CLEAR THAT WE SEE NO REASON FOR IT TO BE REVISED. 
OCCASIONALLY) EFFORTS ARE MADE TO LINK THE DEFENSE 
QUESTION WITH SOME OF OUR BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES. I DO NOT 
BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE CONNECTED. No MATTER HOW SMOOTH OUR 
- . 
ECONOM IC RELATIONSHIP MIGHT BE) OUR TWO NATIONS WOULD STI LL· 
FACE A POTENTIALLY FLUID AND UNSTABLE POLITICO-MILITARY 
SITUATION IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD) AND WE WOULD STILL NEED 
TO ATTEND TO OUR DEFENS ES, I HOP E THAT BOTH AMERICANS AND 
JAPANESE WILL THEREFORE CONTINUE TO SEPARATE THE TWO ISSUES 
OF TRADE AND DEFENSE, 
TURNING TO THE ISSUES AT HAND IN THIS 14TH SESSION OF 
THE SSC1 I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY OFFERING MY COMPLIMENTS 
TO OUR J APANESE COLLEAGUES FOR THE VERY SERIOUS AND HARD-
WORKING EFFORT THEY HAVE MADE OVER THE PAST YEAR TO CONSO LI DATE 
AND GA IN APPROVAL FOR THE NEW FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN) AND 
TO SUSTA IN JAPANESE DEFENSE GROWTH IN A DOMESTIC ATMOSPHERE 
OF SEVERE FISCAL AUSTERITY, 
JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING HAS BEEN HELD TO A LEVEL 
OF ROUGHLY ONE PERCENT OF GNP DURING THE LAST 20 YEARS, 
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NEV~RTHELESSJ TH IS DEFENSE SPENDING HAS BEEN CHARACTER IZED 
BY STEADY GROWTH RATES FOR MANY YEARS NOW) AVERAGING ABOUT 
8 PERCENT REAL GROWTH PER YEAR THROUGH THE 1970s, THE 
JAPANESE MILITARY BUDGET HAS BEEN THE SEVENTH OR EIGHTH 
LARGEST IN THE WORLD FOR MANY YEARS NOW, HOWEVER) FOR THE 
JAPANESE GoVERNM ENT TO REALIZE ITS STATED AIM OF ENHANCING 
ITS MI LITARY POSTURE WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS IT WILL MOST 
LIKELY HAVE TO UNDERTAKE ANNUAL BUDGET INCREASES CONSIDERABLY 
LARGER THAN LAST YEAR'S VERY CREDITABLE EFFORT. THE UNITED 
STATES IS DOING PRECISELY THAT IN ORDER TO SECURE A STABLE 
BALANCE OF POWER, 
HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES HAVE) OF COURSE) ALLOWED THE 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO MAINTA I N STEADY GROWTH IN DEFENSE 
SPEND ING ) WH ILE STAYING BELOW THE POL ITICAL HIGH WATER MARK 
OF ONE PERCENT OF GNP, WITH THE LEVELLING OFF OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH THIS WILL BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO DO, 
WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE PUBLIC SEEMS TO ACCEPT THAT DEFENSE 
SPENDING WILL EVENTUALLY EXCEED ONE PERCENT OF GNP, To 
CONDITION JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING ARBITRARILY ON ONE 
PERCENT OF GNP COULD ~·1EAN AN UNACCEPTABLE LAG IN MODERNIZATION 
OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE FORCES, I HAVE LONG CONTENDED THAT IT 
MAKES NO SENSE TO FOCUS THE DEFENSE DEBATE AND DECISIONS ON 
DEFENSE SPENDING ON AN ARTIFICIALLY CONTRIVED PERCENTAGE OF 
GNP. So I AM PLEASED To SEE THE MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THIS . 
WE ARE ALSO PLEASED WITH THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF 
THE NEW FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS 
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RECENTLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO. WE REALIZE THAT EXTENSIVE 
MODERNIZATION CANNOT TAKE PLACE OVERNIGHT; NEVERTHELESS 
WE STILL HOPE THAT THERE IS ROOM IN THE PROGRAM FOR EARLIER 
ACHIEVEMENT OF SOME OF ITS OBJECTIVES, PARTICULARLY THOSE 
RELATING TO SEALANE DEFENSE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HOPE THAT 
OTHER DEFENSE NEEDS WHICH ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT AND WHICH 
WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES TO SATISFY, WILL NOT 
BE NEGLECTED. LET ME CITE SOME EXAMPLES: 
--ENHANCEMENT OF THE JSDF's COMMAND, CONTROL AND 
COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE; 
--MAKING SDF BASES, RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS SITES 
LESS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK; 
- -ENHANCING THE TRAINING OF SDF PERSONNEL, INCLUDING 
INCREASED FLYING TIME FOR PILOTS AND SHIPBOARD EXPERI ENCE· 
FOR MARITIME PERSONNEL; 
--IMPROVING ITS LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE, 
WE ARE GRATIFIED BY . PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI's INITIATIVE 
IN RECOGNIZING 1,000-MILE SEALANE DEFENSE AS A PRIORITY FOR 
JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE, THE RAPIDLY GROWING SOVIET NAVAL THREAT 
IN THE PACIFIC IS A REALITY THAT WE MUST FACE TOGETHER. To 
THE EXTENT THAT JAPAN CAN BEGIN TO ASSUME GRADUALLY MORE OF 
THE TASK OF DEFENDING ITS OWN VITAL SEALANES OUT TO 1,000 
MILES OVER THE COMING YEARS, US FORCES CAN BE DEPLOYED TO 
OTHER AREAS IN AN EMERGENCY WITHOUT FEAR OF LEAVING JAPAN 
EXPOSED TO SOVIET INTIMIDATION, 
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DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARSJ THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE 
FORCES WILL UNDERGO ' AN IMPRESSIVE MODERNIZATIONJ WHICH WILL 
STRAIN MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING RESOURCES. As THIS MODERNI-
ZATION OCCURSJ THERE WILL BE EXPANSION OF EXISTING MISSIONS 
AND THE ASSUMPTION OF NEW MISSIONSJ SUCH AS SEALANE DEFENSEJ 
ALL WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT JAPAN HAS PLACED ON ITS 
MILITARY POWER. US FORCES WILL ALSO BE UNDERGOING A MAJOR 
PROGRAM OF MODERNIZATION AND STRENGTHENING, THESE TRENDS 
WILL PLACE AN INCREASING BURDEN ON THE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS 
THAT UNDERPIN THE US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY. 
THESE ANNUAL SECURITY SuB-COMMITTEE CONSULTATIONSJ IN 
PARTICULARJ HAVE BECOME A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF THE US-
JAPANESE MUTUAL DEFENSE PLANNJNG PROCESS, ALTHOUGH THE 
DISCUSSIONS ARE PURPOSELY INFORMAL AND LARGELY UNREHEARSEDJ 
THE FACT IS THAT BOTH SIDES DO PUT A LOT OF EFFORT INTO 
THEIR PRESENTATIONS. THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN 
HAWAII EACH YEAR HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO BOTH 
GOVERNMENTS' WORKING LEVEL DELIBERATING, IN JAPAN THESE 
TALKS HAVE THE ADDED DISTINCTION OF RECEIVING WIDE PRESS 
ATTENTIONJ WHICH TENDS TO GIVE THEM AN AURA OF AUTHORITY FAR 
BEYOND WHAT WE ALL KNOW IS THE REALITY! 
NEVERTHELESSJ THIS YEAR AS IN PAST YEARSJ I HOPE WE 
SHALL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN A FREEJ BUT FRUITFULJ EXCHANGE 
OF IDEAS ON THE DEFENSE CHALLENGES THAT FACE US--KEEPING IN 
MIND THAT WE HAVE BEEN INVESTED WITH SIGNIFICANT RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE SMOOTH MANAGEMENT OF ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST IMPORTANT 
ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS. 
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